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I.	Introduction
The aim of this essay is to consider the nature of the philosophical task and of the conditions of its possibility according to Parmenides and Plato. With these thinkers, the task of the philosopher necessitates a propaedeutic activity that makes the doing of philosophy possible; that is, both Parmenides and Plato identify the need for a philosophical education that would alleviate the obstacles that would make philosophy impossible to practise, ensuring and accounting for the possibility of philosophical practice. The impossibility of philosophical practice concerns the philosopher’s claim and obligation to occupy a place (τόπος) from which to contemplate being. The problem becomes conspicuous, for the first time, in the first lines of the first fragment of the first text of pure ontology: in the proemium of Parmenides’ poem. 
I will argue that the proemium has a crucial philosophical function that binds it integrally to the argument of the poem.​[1]​ This function consists in the implementation of a philosophical propaedeutic that makes possible the articulation of the goddess’s critique. The need for a propaedeutic stems from the nature of the project that lies ahead, that is, the project of the youth’s education. Such education takes the form of the delimitation of the realm of the beings that νοῦς can concern itself with.
Parmenides’ poem presents the modern reader of philosophy with a fundamental difficulty: it remains oblivious to ‘the ancient quarrel’ between philosophy and poetry in which Plato enclosed both philosophical and poetic discourse (Republic 607b). Parmenides himself is a distant and precious specimen of a philosopher-poet, a ‘grievous scandal’​[2]​ incomprehensible to philosophers after Plato. His poem is as much a philosophical treatise as well as a religious revelation, composed, as Parmenides’ commentators have recognised, in the style ‘of the epic tradition originating from Homer’​[3]​ and bearing structural and stylistic affinities to Hesiod’s Theogony,​[4]​ Pindar’s odes​[5]​ and the divine language of Orphic and Pythagorean mysteries.​[6]​ The poem, hence, retains the ritual dimension of an apocalyptic incantation and thus possesses a primarily performatory, rather than representing, function, which accentuates its contrast with the canonics of philosophical writing.   
These affinities, and the ensuing contrast, show themselves from the start: the narration begins with the description in the instrumental proemium (B1.1-32)​[7]​ of a revelatory journey which in turn comes to ground the truthfulness and reliability of the narration itself. This is accomplished by making the content of the poem, the narration, equal to the divine language in which it is expressed, that is, by ascribing it to the ‘reliable account’ (πιστὸς λόγος, B8.50) of a divine narrator. Thus, the poem unfolds as the fulfilment of the divine promise: the goddess welcomes (χαῖρε, B1.26) Parmenides and pledges that the youth (κοῦρος) must ‘learn all things – both the unshaken heart of persuasive truth and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance’ (Χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἠμέν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής, B1.28-30). What hence follows flows out of the benevolence of the divine nature and is immersed in divine wisdom.  
This difficulty - the difficulty associated with the possibility of a text standing between philosophy and poetry - has plagued the ability of modern students of the poem to appreciate the extent to which Parmenides’ linguistic medium and the divine message that is therein delivered are bound in the poem. The modern student’s treatment of the proemium is telling of such incapacity.​[8]​ We have been quick to interpret the proemium opening Parmenides’ poem as an awkward opening scene à la Hesiod of little, if any, philosophical value. The consensus has therefore been that the question of the function and the topography of the proemium is one that carries a merely philological or exegetical interest concerning the deciphering of a certain metaphoric configuration of no philosophical interest. In the proemium, as it were, Parmenides wears his poet’s cloak in order to provide a philosophically superfluous introduction to what is philosophically significant, namely the postponed delivery of the divine message.​[9]​ 
Contrary to this appraisal, it will here be argued that the possibility for the delivery of the goddess’s promise is vindicated by Parmenides in a chariot journey that possesses the topographical configuration of a procession to the underworld.  This journey, far from being an unnecessary poetical ornament, possesses a fundamental ontological value that conditions the mode of the goddess’s teaching, such that it not only ought to be narrated and recounted, but performed and lived.​[10]​ Unless Parmenides has invested the proemium with such a function, the divine teaching must remain undelivered and its monist message must be rendered but a shallow puzzle. This requirement will be seen to be operative in the practice of separation that Plato prescribes in Phaedo so that the philosopher’s training for death is inscribed within the Parmenidean aegis under which Plato finds himself at crucial points of the development of his assumptions.​[11]​ 
II.	The Complication of Education
Parmenides’ poem presents the youth’s learning of ‘the unshaken heart of persuasive truth’, which is undertaken under the instruction of the goddess. The propaedeutic function of the proemium to the divine message is necessitated by the requirements of such instruction. That such requirements ensue in the first place means that the divine message cannot be delivered simply, that is, immediately. Rather, this delivery introduces a series of complications appertaining to the communicability of the truth that needs to be learnt by the youth. What necessitates such complication?
The divine monism defended in the main part of the poem delimits the realm of objects that can be brought forward as objects of νοῦς. This procedure bears radical results as it restricts this realm to the plenum of being that ‘remaining the same and by itself it lies and so stays there fixed’ (ταὐτόν τ΄ ἐν ταὐτῷ τε μένον καθ΄ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται χοὔτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει, B8.29-30) over and against the multiplicity of beings. The latter are founded on a structure of ambivalence that Parmenides calls εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα: ‘things that are not, are’ (B7.1). Thus, the disjunction between being and not-being entails the disjunction between being and beings, or the instigation of an ontologically irreconcilable distance between being and beings. As a consequence of this chasm, the possibility of the Eleatic enterprise, that is, the delivery of the monist message, becomes untenable on its own presuppositions: the content of the message precludes the delivery of the message. For to discern the limits of being one cannot assume the privileged position of a spectator outside it. Rather, the locus in which the delivery of the message is made must be situated within the ontological plenum while maintaining a saving distance from it: the youth must be saved as a being even if only in order to become the recipient of the divine message that dissolves him. Unless such a saving distance has been ascertained, the teaching of the goddess cannot be received.
The problem has been suggested, on different grounds and intentions than those here pursued, by Mackenzie. The radical monism that constitutes the content of the goddess’s teaching, Mackenzie notes, ‘denies the separate existence of the agents of rationality, upon whose mutual discourse the argument is based’.​[12]​ As a result, the way of Ἀλήθεια is seen to be the vehicle of a paradox concerning the youth’s privileged position as an enlightened thinker, arising ‘from the assimilation of the thinker into what is’.​[13]​ This paradox requires, therefore, the instigation of the saving distance that suspends the thinker as a being and withholds the assimilation into being. Such a suspension will allow the delivery of the teaching and will condition the possibility of education. 
Now, contrary to modern interpretations closed to this complication, I will argue that Parmenides is not only sensitive to such a requirement for suspension, that is, that he understands the difficulty that the programme of education poses for the monist project; but also, that he adequately addresses the difficulty in the proemium. It is there that Parmenides offers the means to allow the suspension of a being before assimilation into being. 
III.	Questions of Topography
The complication introduced by the tension between incommunicability and the promise of education is reflected in the depiction of the chariot journey recollected in the proemium. On this journey the youth abandons the world of mortals and arrives in the divine realm. The distance and exclusion implicit in this movement of revelation is underlined in a number of ways. The youth is driven on ‘the renowned road of the goddess’ (ὁδὸν […] πολύφημον […] δαίμονος, B1.2-3); this is the road ‘which brings a knowing mortal to all cities one by one’ (ἣ κατὰ πάντ΄ ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα, B1.3); along this road he is being escorted by ‘daughters of the Sun’ (Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, B1.9); and it is the latter who persuade Δίκη to allow the mortal in the divine realm (B1.15-16). In all these ways, the recollected opening scene marks the transformative character of the youth’s undertaking and provides the distance from the world of mortal thought that will later be the object of the goddess’s devastating critique. In Parmenides’ hexameter verse, therefore, the image of the initiatory chariot journey to the realm of the divinity has a philosophical and authorising function.​[14]​ How is this transformative distance gained, such that it allows the teaching of the goddess to be received and her insights shared? 
The answer that has commanded most commentators’ agreement has been to interpret this chasm in terms of heights and, hence, to view the chariot journey that crosses it as an ascent (ἀνάβασις).​[15]​ According to this topography, the chariot travels out of the house of Night (δώματα Νυκτός, B1.9) towards the light (εἰς φάος, B1.10). Before proceeding to explicate the claim that, contrary to this configuration, the philosophical importance of the chariot journey as an ontological condition resides in it being a procession unto death, it will be necessary to examine the way in which this significance is unavailable for the reading of ἀνάβασις. For this turns out to rest upon the same assumptions that reduce the proemium to a superfluous narrative of merely ornamental value; assumptions that do not allow the recognition of the paradox of assimilation, or of the complication that this introduces for the mode of the goddess’s delivery and that, therefore, forbid the acknowledgement of the ontological significance of the chariot journey.
The attraction of ἀνάβασις lies in the acceptance of unwarranted presuppositions about the place of light in Parmenides’ philosophical imagery such that illumination is assumed to be the appropriate metaphor to describe the mode of divine instruction. This imagery of light has favoured and, indeed, presented as almost transparently and naturally suggested the view that the proemium recounts an ἀνάβασις to the divine height where the goddess resides. Fränkel, for instance, is quick to discern in the images of the proemium what he assumes to be an unproblematic identification of light with the ‘power and sovereignty of thought’ and accordingly castigates darkness to the falsehood of the way of mortals:
One and the same thing, the ascent from darkness to light, is symbolised within three lines (9-11) not less than four times: First in the naming of the powers which conduct this ascent as daughters of the Sun, then in the leaving of the House of Night, then in the throwing back of the veil with which the maidens had been covering their heads, and finally in the passage through the gate which divides the paths of day and night. Each of these things signifies the mind’s breakthrough to illumination.​[16]​
When it comes to filling in the details of this initiatory trajectory and providing the topography of the points traversed by the chariot, Parmenides’ modern commentators, supported by Aristotle,​[17]​ confirm Fränkel’s discernment in the symbolisms of the proemium of ‘the ascent from darkness to light’ which signifies the ‘mind’s breakthrough to illumination’.​[18]​ For example, Long identifies truth and error with enlightenment and benightedness respectively;​[19]​ Bowra claims that ‘the transition from night to day is the transition from ignorance to knowledge’​[20]​ and that, therefore, Parmenides regards knowledge ‘as a kind of enlightenment’ and ignorance ‘as a kind of darkness, as obscurity in the strict sense of the word’​[21]​ and that, hence, the proemium recounts ‘a celestial journey’;​[22]​ and Kahn concludes his account of the ‘epistemological colouring’ of the proemium, that is, the nature of the revelation, in the following way:
The chariot journey which Parmenides describes in the proemium is literally a voyage of enlightenment: he travels from darkness into light […]. As perceptive readers have always seen, this narrative of the journey to the goddess is an allegorical representation of Parmenides’ enterprise which attains its goal, since the voyage leads him to a complete revelation of the Truth. Parmenides has done everything possible to render the allegory transparent. The voyager on the right path is ‘a knowing mortal’, conveyed by wise horses and cunning pathfinders; he is led to the light by the spirits of illumination, the Heliades or ‘daughters of the Sun’. […] When he attains his destination, the goddess promises to reveal all things to him, but first of all to instruct him in knowledge of the Truth […].​[23]​ 
But is the allegory of the chariot journey as transparent as Kahn assumes? Such a configuration, one, that is, that identifies revelation with enlightening probing and that portrays the distance gained as one to be ascended is incompatible with Parmenides’ ontological commitments and the poetic-mythological framework in which he shares. Contrary to Fränkel’s commonly and naturally assumed identification of ‘the sovereignty of thought’ and the goddess’s way with enlightenment, the thought that the goddess prescribes cannot and does not lend itself to the metaphor of light-shedding. The problem lies in the idea of an illuminating probing. As soon as one poses the question of what and how such probing reveals, it becomes evident that what is thus revealed is an object of δόξαι; and the mode of this revelation, in contrast to the mode of the goddess’s revelation, entails the ‘sightless eye’ (ἄσκοπον ὄμμα, B7.4) of mortals. For what does illumination reveal but ‘bright colour’ (χρόα φανὸν, B8.41) and an enhanced sensitivity to the detection of movement (τόπον ἀλλάσσειν, B8.41), variation (ἀμείϐειν, B8.41) and, ultimately, individuation (διαιρετόν, B8.22)? If the proemium, that is, describes and prescribes an ascent how could this fail to lead the youth, not to the divine realm of the goddess of stillness, but to the divine abode of the transfiguring Apollo Phoebus? 
On the contrary, for Parmenides the activity of enlightenment is associated with the constitution of appearance rather than truth. Light is the Apolline intruder that can only ever reveal change and variation, ‘an illusion generated by the play of light’.​[24]​ What is revealed in illumination is instituted as a lunar object: the moon (σελήνη) constitutes the paradigm of what appears as an object immersed in light. ​[25]​ Appearing in and through its phases, the moon appears as the object of a play of light. This paradigmatic structure is shared by the objects of δόξαι, in the generation of which shadow play comes to be the constitutive moment. Hence, the lunar description of B14 amounts to a description of the structure possessed by the objects of the mortal world: ‘Night-shining foreign light wandering round earth’ (Νυκτιφαὲς περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς). In Parmenides’ monism, light naturally becomes the principle of the appearing of the mortal world of change, colours and things: shadows, not being; δόξαι, not Ἀλήθεια. The naturalness with which the imagery of illumination suggests itself is undermined by the unnaturalness of such imagery to convey Parmenides’ revelation of truth. Ἀλήθεια does not reveal by shedding light; it reveals being by extinguishing the luminosity of beings.  
This difficulty, however, is enveloped by a deeper and comprehensive failure which opens for us the question of the philosophical function of the proemium; namely, that this act of illumination requires a probing eye to shed light on the supposed darkness of the mortal path. For this distanced point of view is what is precisely annihilated in the argument of the goddess: no distance between being and knowing and no bifurcation internal to being, as in the case of a knower and a known object or an illuminator and an illuminated object, remain possible. On the contrary, the image of illumination is founded upon such a division between a knower who illuminates and the known that comes to be illuminated, a division that is denied in the ontological conclusions of the poem. The proemium, therefore, cannot be seen to be recounting an illuminating ascent into an illuminated realm, since such an interpretation presupposes the individuated subject that receives the divine privileges as objects, an unbearable assumption by the criteria of the ontological monism to which the goddess’s conclusion is committed. The implausibility of Parmenides’ youth ever coming to occupy such a privileged epistemological position undermines Parmenides’ ontological programme as a whole, if this programme is seen to rest upon an enlightening ascent. It is this assumption concerning the topography of the proemium that allows Mackenzie, whose interpretation seems to be using precisely the imagery of light as naturally revelatory, to draw, consistently on these assumptions, the conclusion that Parmenides must face precisely such a ‘reductio per impossibile’.​[26]​ The ascent to illuminating heights cannot but be the journey of a being who as such may neither receive the monist message nor survive the ontological distance between beings and being that the message itself introduces.
Thus, reading the proemium as the depiction of an ἀνάβασις involves tenuous assumptions about the role of light in Parmenides’ philosophical imagery. Light becomes the effect of a privilege granted only once the paradox of assimilation has been ignored and the complication of education overlooked. Such a reading, therefore, obscures the operation that Parmenides assigns to the opening chariot journey. For the ascent presupposes that the message of the goddess can be simply delivered in a process of illumination, thus ignoring the educational complications that the delivery of the monist message entails for the project as a whole. Once we become sensitive to this difficulty and look for ways in which Parmenides might have addressed it, we come to see that the institution of the distance that keeps the mortal youth from being assimilated into the plenum has already been secured before the teaching commences, that is, in the preceding narration and performance of a catabatic chariot journey on which the youth finds himself born on his way to the underworld.
IV.	Τhe Journey to the Underworld in Homer and Hesiod
Epic poetry makes available two modes of treading (βαίνειν) towards the divine realm: κατάβασις into the destructive night (νὺξ ὀλοὴ) and darkness (ζόφος) of the house of Hades below; and ἀνάβασις towards the light (φῶς) of ‘the broad heaven amid the air and the clouds’ (οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι, Il. 15.192) that is the realm of Zeus. The former, then, is Ἄϊδόσδε; the latter, φόωσδε. In the proemium Parmenides appropriates and transforms the mythical geography, without ceasing to rely on it or, according to Havelock’s thoughtful formulation, the ‘philosopher’s poetic memory’ draws ‘evocative contexts’,​[27]​ associations, images and metaphors from Homer and Hesiod and supplants it with a philosophical topography, a configuration of τόποι, and ‘a new myth’​[28]​ that responds to the demands of his ontology.​[29]​ 
I will now identify those episodes and descriptions in the epic poetry of Hesiod and Homer that for philosophical reasons, i.e. for reasons that concern the ontological account of the divine message, are important for the interpretation of the proemium of Parmenides’ poem. My aim will be to give philosophical reasons, rather than philological, why we should accept Havelock’s claim that ‘books ten to twelve of the Odyssey’ provide Parmenides’ ‘central frame of reference’​[30]​ and, further, to draw out the implications of such an interpretation. I do not intend to follow Havelock in the identification of the youth with Odysseus, but it will be argued that Parmenides finds in Homer a certain conception of darkness and light that enables him characterise the nature of revelation or the means of securing knowledge in matters of ontology. Parmenides (and Plato after him) utilises the established significations found in the epic poems of Homer and Hesiod (the darkness of Hades, the catabatic trajectory, the routes and ‘ways of darkness’ and the power of its destructiveness), transforms them into philosophical τόποι and invests them with an importance that is ontological.
The most important precedent of a catabatic voyage in Greek literature is Odysseus’ descent to Hades, which is the subject of the Νέκυια (Book of the Dead), as Book 11 of the Odyssey is known.​[31]​ Odysseus, encouraged by Circe, completes ‘another journey’ (ἄλλην ὁδὸν, Od. 10.489, 500 and 562), that is, other than the one that would take him back to Ithaca, that leads him to the house of Hades (εἰς Ἀίδαο δόμους, Od. 10.490). The purpose of this journey is to ‘seek soothsaying of the spirit of Theban Teiresias, the blind seer’ Od. 10.492-3). The destination is located ‘beneath the depths of the earth’ (ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης, Od. 24.204)​[32]​ so that Hades is often addressed as Ζεύς καταχθόνιος, or as the lord of the underworld (ὑπένεθρε ἄναξ ἐνέρων ᾈδωνεὺς, Il. 20.60).​[33]​ Odysseus descends to the ‘dank house of Hades’ (εἰς Ἀίδεω ἰέναι δόμον εὐρώεντα, Od. 10.512).​[34]​ The realm is described as one of ‘murky darkness’ (ζόφον ἠερόεντα, Od. 11.155):​[35]​ ‘never does the sun look down on them with his rays […] but baneful night (νὺξ ὀλοὴ) is spread over wretched mortals’ (Od. 11.15). For Parmenides and Plato, re-writing the Νέκυια, this darkness acquires a philosophical significance that allies the house of Hades and the unseen realm of intelligibility (τοῦ ἀιδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου, as Plato writes at Phaedo 81d1). When the Sun demands Odysseus’ punishment for having killed his cattle, he threatens Zeus that he will descend (δύσομαι) to Hades and shed his light (φαείνω) on the dead (Od. 12.383); and when the spirit of Teiresias approaches Odysseus, the seer asks: ‘Why hast thou left the light of the sun (λιπὼν φάος ἠελίοιο) and come hither to behold the dead and a region where is no joy (ἀτερπέα χῶρον)?’(Od. 11.93-94). Antikleia, Odysseus’ dead mother, bids him to undertake the voyage back into the light (φόωσδε, Od. 11.223), and not to stay ‘beneath the murky darkness (ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα), being still alive (ζωὸς)’ as it is hard for the living to ‘behold these realms (ὁρᾶσθαι)’ (Od. 11.155-6) but to return ‘beneath the rays of the sun’ (ὑπ᾽ αὐγὰς ἠελίοιο, Od.11.619). Odysseus’ journey, then, takes the traveller out of the light shone by Helius ‘who gives light to mortals’ (ἠέλιος φαεσίμβροτος, Od. 10.138 and 191), into this destructive darkness, on the same route that the souls of the dead take: 
So these [spirits of the wooers] went with him gibbering, and Hermes, the Helper, led them down the dank ways.  [κατ᾽ εὐρώεντα κέλευθα]. Past the streams of Oceanus they went, past the rock Leucas, past the gates of the Sun [Ἠελίοιο πύλας] and the land of dreams [δῆμον ὀνείρων], and quickly came to the mead of asphodel [ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα], where the spirits dwell, phantoms of men  who have done with toils [εἴδωλα καμόντων]. 
(Od. 24.9-14).
Among the τόποι described and fixed in Hesiod’s Theogony, the primary antithesis is again between the misty Tartarus (Ταρτάρου ἠερόεντος, 119, 653, 658, 682, 721, 729, 736, 739 and 807) and the starry heaven (οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος, 106, 127, 414, 463, 470, 685, 737, 808, 810 and 891).​[36]​ The latter is the ‘an ever-sure abiding-place’ (ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί, 128)​[37]​ for the gods; the former is the realm of the ‘god of the lower-world (θεοῦ χθονίου), strong Hades’ (767), which ‘even the gods abhor’ (τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ, 739 and 810) and find awful (δεινὸν, 743-4). ‘The dim Tartarus’ (Τάρταρά τ᾽ ἠερόεντα, 119) is (with some ambiguity) the name of the wider realm ‘under the earth’ (ὑπὸ χθονὶ δώματα, 455), ‘where Hades rules over the dead below’ (ἐνέροισι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσων, 850), enclosing, among others, the houses of Hades, of Night and of Styx. Over this realm ‘the glowing sun’ (Ἠέλιος φαέθων, 760) never shines, neither rising (ἀνιὼν) nor setting (καταβαίνων) (761). It is situated ‘beneath the wide-pathed earth’ (ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης, 717), which one reaches by descending (κατιὼν, 723) the ‘loathsome and dank’ (ἀργαλέ᾽ εὐρώεντα, 739) and ‘great chasm’ (χάσμα μέγα) into ‘the misty gloom’ (ὑπὸ ζόφῳ ἠερόεντι, 729) of ‘a dunk place’ (χώρῳ ἐν εὐρώεντι, 731) under the earth (ἔνερθ᾽ ὑπὸ γῆς, 720), enclosed by a ‘fence of bronze’ (χάλκεον ἕρκος, 726), which can only be reached by passing through the ‘shining gates (πύλαι) and an immoveable threshold’ (οὐδὸς ἀστεμφής, 811-12). The one who passes the gates finds oneself in ‘the awful home of murky Night wrapped in dark clouds’ (νυκτὸς δ᾽ ἐρεβεννῆς οἰκία δεινὰ ἕστηκεν νεφέλῃς κεκαλυμμένα κυανέῃσιν, 744-5) at the door of which 
Night and Day draw near and greet one another as they pass the great threshold [οὐδὸν] of bronze: and while the one is about to go down [καταβήσεται] into the house, the other comes out at the door [θύραζε ἔρχεται]. And the house never holds them both within; but always one is without the house [ἔκτοσθεν] passing over the earth, while the other stays at home [ἐντὸς] and waits until the time for her journeying [ὁδοῦ] come; and the one holds all-seeing light [φάος πολυδερκὲς] for them on earth, but the other holds in her arms Sleep the brother of Death, even evil Night [Νὺξ ὀλοή], wrapped in a vaporous cloud [νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένη ἠεροειδεῖ].​[38]​
(Theogony 748-757)
In contrast, heaven constitutes a realm of brightness and visibility and is inhabited by illuminating deities (‘great Helius and clear Selene and Eos’, 371-2 and the ‘gleaming stars with which heaven is crowned’, 382) which shine (φαείνει) ‘upon all that are on earth (ἐπιχθονίοισι) and upon the deathless gods who live in the wide heaven’ (372-3). The realm of mortals is as such lighted up and stands as an illuminated world under a glow (αὐγὴ), whether that be ‘the far-seen gleam of unwearying fire’ (ἀκαμάτοιο πυρὸς τηλέσκοπον αὐγὴν, 566) or the glow of the ‘tireless Sun’ (Ἠέλιόν τ’ ἀκάμαντον, according to a Homeric Hymn to Helios). 
The two trajectories in Hesiod are defined according to the direction taken in relation to the gates, πυλέων ἔκτοσθεν (753) or πυλέων ἔντοσθε (741): on the one hand, an ascent (ἀνάγειν) into the light (ἐς φάος, 626 and 652) out of ‘the murky gloom’ (ὑπὸ ζόφου ἠερόεντος, 653 and 658). One who travels on this road and direction is ‘brought up to the light (φόωσδε) from Erebus beneath the earth (Ἐρέβεσφιν ὑπὸ χθονὸς)’ (669). On the other hand, a descent (καταπέμπειν) εἰς Ἔρεβος (515).
Furley notes that the house of Night ‘has a clear place in Greek mythology […]. It lies on the edge of the world, where Earth, Tartarus, Sea, and Heaven have their sources, and where a mysterious bottomless chasm gapes open’:​[39]​ 
It is a great gulf [χάσμα μέγα], and if once a man were within the gates, he would not reach the floor until a whole year had reached its end [τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν], but cruel blast upon blast would carry him this way and that. And this marvel is awful even to the deathless gods.
(Theogony 740-4)
The term τελεσφόρον in a negative context amplifies the image of a journey without end (τέλος) but without lacking direction (i.e. it is not παλίντροπος). The destination of the descent, then, is not a place or ground of discernment (furthest, many-folded, great and high Olympus) but the lack of place or ground: in Parmenides’ words, a χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς (B1.18). In Hesiod, as well as in Parmenides, a certain priority is accorded to this chasm in relation to the realm of the gods: among the things that came to be, Parmenides’ goddess includes ‘furthest Olympus’ (Parmenides, B11.2-3); and, in the Theogony, even the ‘deathless gods’ (782) dwelling​[40]​ ‘the peaks of snowy Olympus’ (42, 62, 118 and 794) are humbled by the sight of the χάσμα.
V.	Τόποι
Parmenides’ youth treads on a ‘seeking route’ (ὁδοὶ διζήσιος, Parmenides, B2.2, 6.3, 7.2) towards a destination that is sought for (‘as far as my spirit ever aspired’, ὅσον τ΄ ἐπἱ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι, B1.1):​[41]​ what is the mode of catabatic treading dramatised in the proemium such that it is distinguished from anabatic modes of arriving at a destination?
In The Century, Alain Badiou presents an account of ascent which provides a valuable contrast with the journey of the youth in Parmenides’ proemium. The youth’s chariot journey also ‘requires that thinking accept a discipline’.​[42]​ The anabatic movement of Xenophon’s Ten Thousand, Badiou claims, is a ‘movement of lost men, out of place’; in other words, ἀνάβασις is a “‘homeward” movement’, a wandering for the sake of a return to origin, ‘a re-ascent towards the source’.​[43]​ The movement of the Ten Thousand (as well as Odysseus’) is οἴκαδε, and the principle that propels and navigates them towards a destination is that of lostness. The same difference distinguishes Odysseus’ homeward trajectory (νόστος), fuelled by his nostalgia and desire for Ithaca, from the adventure that Circe has in mind for him and his companions. On the contrary, the return of the κατάβασις (Circe’s other route to the underworld) culminates in the arrival to the uninhabitable abode of inhuman and divine truth: the desert or the underworld. If the thinker is lost, his predicament is not the result of the loss of origin or place: the thinker leaves place in order to return as one without place. The desert becomes the site of origination, which means that the uninhabitable becomes the place of habitation. In Xenophon, the wandering takes place in the desert and culminates in the arrival to the habitable, the source in which we are found at last, the place in which we cease to be out of place. If the catabatic wanderer is a foreigner, it is because this source cannot contain him: his wandering is οἴκoθεν rather than οἴκαδε, to another οἴκος that is equal to his exuberance. But this can only be contained in the wretchedness of the desert, where the hermit returns only insofar as he returns to what is not his place, since it is not strictly speaking a place. In the paradoxical specificity of this destination lies the distinction between κατάβασις and ἀνάβασις.
In this respect, Badiou’s (i.e. Xenophon’s) anabasis lacks the characteristics that other notable returns to an inhuman origin and a divine source exhibit. Chief among them is Moses’ ascent to Mount Sinai, which, far from constituting a movement of ascent, is best seen as a catabatic journey and arrival. Moses accesses the inaccessible and inhabits the uninhabitable. What kind of return is this that, instead of bringing a man back into place, returns man to a place of no return; that, instead of recapturing an origin of derivation, man finds his origin in what is absolutely beyond him? How is man delivered from lostness and found, how does his journey end, when he is found in lostness and his journey ends at an inaccessible and unreachable destination which no journey, no departure and arrival between τόποι can reach? How can this circulation end in a τόπος, the dwelling place of God, the abode of the goddess?
As Lossky reads Dionysius the Aeropagite’s profound interpretation of Moses’ ascent, Moses’ journey ‘to scale the most sublime heights of sanctity’ amounts to the task of penetrating ‘the darkness wherein He who is beyond all created things [i.e. beyond all dwelling] makes his dwelling’.​[44]​ The problem, then, is the possibility and mode of arrival at a dwelling beyond all dwelling. This cannot be the τόπος of arrival for Badiou’s anabasis, since it cannot constitute a dwelling. If Moses undertakes an ascent it is not at all in the sense in which Badiou conceives of the term. Sinai is not the ‘high’ (μακρός, Theogony 680), ‘great’ (μέγας, 842) and ‘many-folded’ (πολύπτυχος, 104) Olympus: its peak lies in the depths under the earth. Κατάβασις should be understood in terms other than those of below and above; and by means of a more profound rendering of the distinction between darkness and light. The darkness (which in Greek myth is below and in Dionysius’ interpretation of the Biblical story above) is distinctive as a point of arrival since it denotes the inaccessibility of this point, its absence as such, and hence the mode of treading towards this absence; this is the essential characterization of κατάβασις. In other words, the presence ‘which occupies […] His holy places’ is, for Parmenides’ youth, Dionysius’ Moses and for the ascetic, the absence a place, the accessibility of the inaccessible.​[45]​ 
The contrast with Badiou’s anabasis is profound. The Ten Thousand are, according to Parmenides’ description, πολύπειροι (Parmenides, B7.3): they collect and learn all things under the sun and, as it were, through the sun, i.e. by seeing what is constituted as seen (τὰ ὁρώμενα) and by themselves being constituted as seeing (οἱ ὁρῶντες). Insofar as this is the case, the travellers acquire experience by means of ‘sightless eye and sounding ear and tongue’ (ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν καὶ γλῶσσαν, Parmenides, B7.4-5). The youth, Moses and the ascetic abandon and forget both the objects seen and themselves as seeing (τῶν ὁρομένων καὶ τῶν ὁρώντων): they pursue the same ἀπειρία that Aristotle diagnosed as the failure of Eleatic philosophy; by unknowing (ἀγνωσία), they unlearn and, in this way, pass into the ‘darkness of ignorance’, see ‘what is entirely […] unseen’ and reach the unreachable and access the inaccessible.​[46]​ We are already very far from Bowra’s assumption that ‘Parmenides thinks that a man who does not know the truth is in the dark’.​[47]​ In inverting the τόπος of the destination of the τόπος of knowledge from light to darkness, in substituting κατάβασις for ἀνάβασις, one inverts the manner one reaches the destination (not as πολύπειρος but as εἰδώς φώς (Parmenides, B1.3) as well the nature of this τόπος. The darkness, then, understood in Dionysius’ profound way, constitutes the condition for the possibility of another seeing, learning and knowledge, one which is fitting for the contemplation (in Parmenides and Plato) or union (in apophatic theology) of the divine nature, of the arrival into the dwelling place of the divinity who does not dwell.
Badiou associates κατάβασις with ‘the Great Temptation’ that ontology must resist. The temptation is raised when being, ‘not allowing itself to be known within the articulations of the place, can only be seen or contemplated by a gaze which is the result of an initiatory journey’.​[48]​ This is ‘path of thought’ traversed in negative theologies or by those seeking ‘mystical annihilation’, or by those for whom insight is to be found in ‘the poetic resource of language alone’. 
It is for this reason that the mode of treading that culminates in this darkness, κατάβασις, is the proper trajectory, the ἄλλη ὁδὸς which Circe claims must be traversed before Odysseus’ return to homely Ithaca (which is a route of another nature altogether: this is a mortal homeward journey between places that provide the ‘measures of [Odysseus’] path’ (μέτρα κελεύθου, Od. 10.539) and that culminate in a return (νόστος, Od. 10.539), the ὁδὸς of Parmenides’ youth, of Moses, of the ascetic, on which they ‘enter within the cloud’​[49]​ wherein they see the invisible and know the unknowable. It is the same ὁδὸς which, when treaded, makes possible the delivery of an incommunicable divine message. The ἄλλη ὁδὸς that Circe determines (τεκμήρατο) for Odysseus, that is, the one that takes him to ‘the house of Hades and dread Persephone in order to consult the soul of the Theban Teiresias’ (εἰς Ἀίδαο δόμους καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείης ψυχῇ χρησομένους Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο, Od. 10.562-564) disrupts the wandering, by giving it its measures: the man who descends is then able to navigate and orientate his ἀνάβασις to Ithaca. This is a route that is ‘far from the beaten path of humans’ (ἀπ΄ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου, Parmenides. B1.27) that does not ‘trace the curve of a return’,​[50]​ neither to Odysseus’ Ithaca, nor to the Ten Thousand’s sea (θάλασσα), and that does not end with the arrival or begin by departing towards ‘a properly human home’.​[51]​ Nevertheless, it is on account of the journey to the underworld that the Odysseus’ journey to Ithaca, the νόστος μελιηδής (Od. 11.100), acquires its orientation and looks for (δίζηαι) Ithaca, without which the mortal travellers, as Parmenides writes, ‘knowing nothing (εἰδότες οὐδέν), two-headed (δίκρανοι), wander (πλάττονται)’ (Parmenides, B6.4-5) on a path that is ‘backward-turning (παλίντροπος κέλευθος)’ (B6.9): ‘For helplessness in their breasts guides (ἰθύνει) their wandering mind (πλακτὸν νόον). But they are carried on (φοροῦνται) equally deaf and blind, amazed, hordes without judgement (ἄκριτα φῦλα)’ (Parmenides, B6.5-7).
We have thus reached the essential characterization of darkness, as the realm of the visibility of what is invisible, of light, as the principle of mortal vision, of κατάβασις, as the journey to a divinity that cannot be seen, illuminated, accessed or exhausted (below or above), i.e. to a divine ἀτοπος τόπος, and of ἀνάβασις as the transport proper to mortals, i.e. the journey between τόποι.
To tread the path that leads to the goddess (ὁδὸν πολύφημον δαίμονος, Parmenides B1.1-3) then involves that the traveller proceeds in a mode that is foreign even inimical to the way in which he, as a mortal, has learnt to approach a destination, navigate and orientate himself in relation to this destination. Thus the urgency of Odysseus’ question: ‘who will guide us on this journey?’ (τίς γὰρ ταύτην ὁδὸν ἡγεμονεύσει, Od. 10.500), which is also a plea for initiation to the ways of this travelling. Since what is now arrived at is not a τόπος but the uninhabitable, there is the need that the traveller be led by a fitting companion. In Parmenides’ proemium, it is the daughters of the Sun (Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, B1.9) that ‘were guiding (ἡγεμόνευον) the way’ (B1.5). In the Odyssey, it is Circe, herself a daughter of the Sun (Od. 10.138) who promises to steer Odysseus’ ship to the underworld. In Plato it is philosophy that becomes the ἡγεμῶν of this journey, the path itself (ἀτραπός) ‘that will guide us out of our confusion’ (Phaedo 66b) and will terminate the wandering of our mortal ascents, our νόστος in actuality. Again the complexity of this path, its non-simplicity, is a feature that Plato’s description emphasises. Κατάβασις, the path of philosophy that leads to being, is a journey along a labyrinthine route such that the task of philosophy is to supplant Ariadne and weave its own guiding thread for the philosopher, who finds his mythological counterpart in Theseus.​[52]​ Odusseus, Parmenides’ youth and Socrates himself are born and guided along the labyrinthine route of descent.
VI.	Κατάβασις
The rejection of ascent in favour of a reading of descent (κατάβασις) does not amount to a simple reversal of the traditionally established topography. The choice is not between two commensurate horns of a dilemma, i.e. heaven or underworld, the peaks of ‘high Olympus’ (μακρὸς Ὄλυμπος, Theogony 118) or the depths of Hades. Instead, the reversal of destinations amounts to a reversal in the mode of advancing towards a destination. The question, then, is whether or in what sense the journey from light to darkness is a journey from ignorance to knowledge; to determine the destination (δόμος and ἕδρη) and the path (ὁδός) (Theogony 386-7) that leads to knowledge. In other words, assuming that the trajectory described in Parmenides’ B1 is the trajectory of a route that departs from ignorance and ends in knowledge, it turns out that, in Parmenides, this journey cannot be conceived of unambiguously as an allegory of divine illumination; for if the youth departs from the darkness of mortal ignorance and arrives in the light of divine knowledge, as the ascent interpretations would have it, it is only because the youth abandons the luminous visibility of mortal knowledge and arrives in the darkness, the cloud that impairs vision, of divine ignorance.
Ἀνάβασις is the trail of a being that culminates in the simple arrival to the divine realm. Its simplicity resides in the conspicuous absence of any acts of initiation: the divine message is assumed to allow for its uncomplicated delivery. Initiation here means that propaedeutic procedure according to which a being that is and is not is transformed into a being that is, such that this being will be allowed to receive the message that dictates its annihilation, while postponing this annihilation in the institution of a saving distance between it and the plenum. This mode of treading is unavailable for ἀνάβασις. Throughout the ascent the youth steadfastly maintains himself as a mortal being constituted in the conjunction of being and not-being. His arrival, thus, becomes a matter of transposition from the mortal into the divine realm of the same being stubbornly preserved in its mortal constitution. This is a simple arrival since it is founded on the failure to thematise the paradox of assimilation as the problem facing Parmenides’ youth from the start. Ἀναβασις presupposes, in other words, that the passage from illusion to truth can be brought about through a mode of treading that preserves the being of the youth though the journey untransformed. 
This is the reason why the proemium has been read as devoid of philosophical interest; an estimate stemming from the failure to appreciate the need for a passage of initiation dictated by ontological considerations.​[53]​ This is also why the reading of ἀνάβασις is precisely a reading that admits and confirms this estimate: there is no reason for a proemium since the there is no need to legitimise the passage from illusion to truth or to explain the possibility of the delivery of a monist message to a plural being, both of these being simply effected. Contrary to such simplicity, Parmenides recognised that this transposition is not possible and that the arrival to the realm of the goddess involves a price to be paid in the form of an initiatory and, thus, transforming passage. But this means that the proemium is not an ornament but is philosophically necessitated by the recognition of the paradox of assimilation, a paradox that has been argued to threaten the possibility of achieving the divine point of view and, hence, the Eleatic project from its very beginning. 
The reversal of destinations and readings, therefore, relies upon the substitution of one mode of being towards a destination, of travelling along a route, for another. This means that it is not the destination that accounts for the revelatory function of the proemium and the instigation of the transformative distance in the medium of which the poem reveals, but the mode of treading afforded by and appropriate to such a destination. How does κατάβασις afford this substitution? And what mode of arrival does it make possible such that it saves the youth from the assimilation that now becomes recognised? 
The catabatic proemium is ontologically charged since it recognises and addresses the paradox at the heart of the youth’s position as a recipient of the monist teaching. For the same reason it is a necessary, rather than superfluous, opening. It seeks to provide the saving distance that preserves the youth as a being and that facilitates the delivery of the divine message. Κατάβασις accomplishes this by making possible a mode of treading and arrival that saves the youth and postpones his assimilation; it does this, paradoxically, by propelling the youth unto his death.
Reading the journey as one towards the underworld allows us to draw a trajectory along which the youth travels transfigured. The youth has abandoned the world of mortals, but that means just this: that the youth no longer carries around his mortal constitution of being and not-being. Instead, he finds himself born (φερόμην, B1.4) on the way from being and not-being to being. Thus, he loses himself as a being as he proceeds along the ‘renowned way’ to the divinity. What he comes to gain through this loss is the initiatory displacement of his being that is required for his education. How does death afford such displacement? And what is signified by ‘death’ in this context?    
The underworld affords a location that does not presuppose an individuated position outside being; on the contrary, it requires the dissolution of the youth’s being in the stillness of being. The mode of treading appropriate to such destination is one of constant displacement and loss: the youth, rather than travel transposed, that is, as the being that he is, proceeds as an ongoing purgatory project in and through which his being sheds reliance on not-being. The youth is not a being of the mortal world; on the other hand, he is on the way of transforming himself into a being facing his assimilation into the plenum. The journey, however, assures that the destination has yet to be reached. This affords the saving distance between himself, as a being of δόξαι to be dissolved, and the being that signifies his end as a being of δόξαι. The attainment of truth involves the thinker’s descent out of the mortal world of colours, variations and warmth: the being thus revealed is, as Fränkel points out (albeit failing to appreciate the extent to which the proemium is already situated within this revelation), radically uneventful.​[54]​ Κατάβασις and the mode of treading that it makes possible reveal the proemium as already integrally encompassed in this uneventfulness, confirming and anticipating the absolute disjunction between being and not-being that is the goddess’s message. 
It is this sense of a fundamental κρίσις between being and not-being that also frames Plato’s thinking on death (θάνατος) as a philosophical practice of separation (ἀπαλλαγή) in Phaedo 64a-67e. Phaedo provides resources that are valuable for the investigation of Parmenidean κατάβασις: it furnishes a conception of death and a mode of treading that not only confirm the catabatic trajectory but that also reveal in Plato the instigation of an initiatory journey of the kind enacted in Parmenides’ proemium.   
VII.	Death and philosophy in the Phaedo
Between the descent narrated in Parmenides’ proemium and Dionysius’ reading of Moses’ ascent stands Platonism, the tradition that developed and reworked, whether in Plato’s dialogues or in Plotinus’ treatises, the theme of revelatory darkness and the journey to the underworld. The Phaedo, of course, is Plato’s re-writing of the Νέκυια, a correction and improvement on Homer’s account of κατάβασις. Socrates the philosopher shares with Odysseus the privilege of woe of ‘having gone down alive to the house of Hades to meet death twice, while other men die but once’ (οἳ ζώοντες ὑπήλθετε δῶμ᾽ Ἀίδαο, δισθανέες, ὅτε τ᾽ ἄλλοι ἅπαξ θνῄσκουσ᾽ ἄνθρωποι, Od. 12.21-22). The first thing that Plato corrects is the hierarchy between life and death that one finds reflected in Achilles’ words: ‘I should choose, so I might live on earth, to serve as the hireling of another, of some portionless man whose livelihood was but small, rather than to be lord over all the dead that have perished’ (βουλοίμην κ᾽ ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ, ἀνδρὶ παρ᾽ ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη, ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν Od. 11.489-491). When Odysseus learns from Circe the impossible task that lies ahead, that he must tread the ἄλλη ὁδὸς, his reaction is one of despair and mourning, ‘weeping and writhing’ (κλαίων τε κυλινδόμενος): ‘So she spoke, and my spirit was broken within me, and I wept as I sat on the bed, nor had my heart any longer desire to live and behold the light of the sun’ (ὣς ἔφατ᾽, αὐτὰρ ἐμοί γε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ· κλαῖον δ᾽ ἐν λεχέεσσι καθήμενος, οὐδέ νύ μοι κῆρ ἤθελ᾽ ἔτι ζώειν καὶ ὁρᾶν φάος ἠελίοιο, Od. 10.495-498).​[55]​ 
Plato follows Parmenides closely in the reversal of the significance accorded to the journey to the underworld:  ‘it was not an evil destiny (μοῖρα κακὴ) that sent you forth to travel this road (τήνδ΄ ὁδόν)’ (Parmenides, B1.26-27), the goddess declares to the youth; and in the Phaedo, Plato ascribes philosophical significance to Phaedo’s claim that ‘even in going down to the underworld [Socrates] was going with the god’s blessing’ (μηδ᾽ εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, Phaedo 58e3-4). Thus, in constrast to Odysseus and his companions, who mourn at the prospect of the journey, the reaction of the disciples is conditional or ambivalent as they are taken over by ‘an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and pain, […] sometimes laughing, sometimes weeping’ (Phaedo 59a). This ambivalence reflects Socrates’ reconfiguration of the relation between life and death, which itself is made possible only after Parmenides has invested the journey to the underworld with an ontological and educational function as well as a unique destination that is absent from Homer’s description of the journey. In the face of death (μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, Phaedo 63e), Socrates himself is ‘full of good hope’ (εὔελπις, Phaedo 63c), cheer (θαρρεῖν, Phaedo 63e) and rejoices (χαίρειν, Phaedo 62e); and the insistence that death is not a disaster is a central preoccupation of the dialogue, which accordingly sets out to show why ‘true philosophers are nearly dead’ or how ‘they deserve to be’ or what sort ‘of death they deserve’ (Phaedo 64b). The way this is shown is through the definition of death (θάνατος) as the separation of the soul from the body (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν, Phaedo 64c) and the delimitation of the philosopher’s concerns (σπουδαῖ φιλοσόφων).​[56]​ What puts into effect this delimitation is the nature of the philosophers’ search, which is none other than the seeking of being (ζήτησις ὄντος). Since the body is an obstacle (ἐμπόδιον) for the ‘acquiring of knowledge’ (φρονήσεως κτήσιν), the philosopher is one who habitually ‘turns away from the body towards the soul’ (64e) and ‘frees the soul from association with the body as much as possible’ (65a). Plato makes manifest what remains latent in Parmenides’ proemium: as long as the philosopher’s concern is being and the philosopher is the one who reaches that destination (ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος, 66a), then the philosophy is the propaedeutic to such an arrival which is equal to death. The philosopher is one who, ‘using pure thought alone (αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ), tries to track down (θηρεύειν) each reality pure and by itself (αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον), freeing himself (ἀπαλλαγεὶς) as far as possible from eyes and ears and, in a word, from the whole body (σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος)’, which ‘does not allow [the soul] to acquire truth and wisdom (οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν)’ (66a). The way of knowledge is now explicitly the journey yonder (ἀποδημία, (Phaedo 61e) and ‘the one aim of those who practise philosophy in the proper manner is to practice fro dying and death’ (Phaedo 64a). A life in philosophy is but the preparation for death: the philosopher equips himself with the thread that will allow him to travel through the labyrinthine route of descent. Plato develops new metaphors to convey this function: it  
In interpreting the proemium as ‘an anticipation of death’,​[57]​ the journey is recognised as the purgatory passage out of the lifeful unreality of appearances into the uneventful reality of being. It therefore involves the death of the mortal youth conceived of and experienced as the recovery of the fullness of being. In this way the proemium depicts a double movement of, on the one hand, destitution and, on the other hand, restoration in the anticipation of death. What, in the mortal reading, presents itself as negation is, for the divine reader, the purging of negation out of being. By presenting, therefore, what is seemingly a passage out of being into not-being, the proemium recounts what in reality is the passage out of not-being into being, out of illusion into truth.
This trajectory becomes the motif supporting Plato’s description of the philosophical task as a practice of death. Notably for our purposes, this description thematises the conception of death as the process out of being and not-being towards being. Death in Phaedo becomes again the vehicle of an ontological proemium that, by now, is seen to be the task of the philosopher: the philosophical life enacts the proemium by performing a κατάβασις. 
Indeed, in Plato’s thought κατάβασις acquires a deep philosophical significance. The Platonic description of the philosophic life as one of constant ‘practice for dying (ἀποθνῄσκειν) and death (τεθνάναι)’ in Phaedo 64-68c extends beyond the mundane condemnation of the body as a source of distraction. Rather, the philosopher’s rapport with being and the recollection of being that affords knowledge are only possible in the philosophical pursuit of separation, that is, in the ‘training for dying’ (Phaedo 67e5). The thinker deserves death insofar as he deserves to be admitted into the House of Night and, allowed by Δίκη, receive the teaching of the goddess. Accordingly, the life of the body is an impediment to the recollection of the divine insight, not merely because it distracts from the philosophical endeavour but fundamentally because it remains foreign to the death that marks being as uneventful: ἀτρεμὲς (Parmenides, B1.29).  
The language of purification and purging that Plato employs in his description of the philosophical death as the ‘path (ἀτραπός) to guide us out of our confusion’ (Phaedo 66b4) draws its pertinence from the fact that the conception of being towards which knowledge tends remains tied to Parmenides’ uneventful reality. Life and the body as the vehicle of life can only be associated with an illuminatory activity that reveals individuated, colourful, changing beings in time; the body therefore projects the shadow play that is life and living, remaining foreign to the dark and inviolate (ἄσυλον, Parmenides, B8.48) heart of the one, unchanging and uneventful being that can only be revealed in its darkness and experienced as death. It is in this way that the lover of wisdom is granted divine wisdom and hence it is the chariot journey of the proemium of Parmenides’ poem that frames the trajectory of the separation prescribed by Plato and the hope that he attaches to death:
Will then the a true lover of wisdom, who has a similar hope [ἐλπίδα] and knows that he will never find it to any extent except in Hades, be resentful of dying and not gladly undertake the journey thither? One must surely think so, my friend, if he is a true philosopher, for he is firmly convinced that he will not find pure knowledge anywhere except there.
(Phaedo 68a7-b4)
Thus, Plato, following Parmenides, presents philosophical education as entailing the context of the purifying darkness in which the goddess delivers her message. Accordingly the trajectory of the chariot journey and the destination to which the philosopher arrives, in which being comes to be revealed, have been determined in Parmenides’ poem. The uneventfulness that Parmenides takes to be the sole characteristic of being provides the framework in which to understand, on the one hand, Plato’s relentless pursuit of the darkness that emanates from death and the ‘bottomless chasm’​[58]​ that stages it and, on the other hand, the condemnation of the illuminating light of life and its ὀρῶμενα (sensible) and πολλά (many and individuated) objects. The Platonic prescription for the separation of soul and body in philosophical death rests on the Eleatic ἔλεγχος which commands the holding apart of being, as what is ‘itself by itself with itself, eternally one in form’ (Symposium 211b1), and not-being. This injunction reveals being as τὸ ἀδόξαστον (Phaedo 84a8) the recovery of which demands that the youth ‘climb down, into the abyss of all things’, as Nietzsche writes of the Parmenidean κατάβασις.​[59]​ Treading this path, the youth comes to be the recipient of the divine teaching.
VIII.	Implications and Conclusion
I have attempted a reading of the proemium that invests the opening chariot journey with a propaedeutic rigour that makes possible a novel understanding of the delivery of the goddess’s gift. Furthermore, in disclosing some of the ways in which the rhetorical stratification of the poem reflects Parmenides’ ontological commitments, this interpretation demonstrates the entwinement of philosophy and poetry upon which Parmenides founds the possibility of the articulation of the monist message.​[60]​
Ι have argued for a reading of the proemium as recounting a catabatic journey, motivated not only by philological but also by philosophical considerations. We must now develop a number of philosophical implications that this interpretation has. First, κατάβασις responds to the complexity of philosophical education. It acknowledges that one does not pass from ignorance to knowledge but that this movement is infinitely complex and rich. In effect, Parmenides bars Meno from receiving the divine message by responding to his paradox of enquiry in the Meno. There the problem that is raised against Plato’s mode of seeking stems from a conception of ignorance and knowledge akin to the one assumed in the anabatic interpretation of the poem. The proemium, the first text on philosophical method, complicates such an assertion by ascribing a place to ignorance.
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